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RECENT CASES
One can argue with Manfield's evaluation of the balance.3 9 The most
serious criticism of his approach is that it brings little in the way of analytic
guidelines to the trall court level. Ultimately each case presents a new
balancing process with prior case law only providing an analogy.
One can sympathize with the Bronstein court's refusal to characterize
the use of the marijuana sniffing dogs as a search. Such an approach
preempts many difficult and ambiguous problems concerning the balanc-
ing of society's interests against an individual's interest. Analytically, the
use of the dogs is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In
evaluating the legality of that search, a Terry type sliding scale approach
would produce a result more consistent with society's reasonable needs of
crime detection and the individual's fourth amendment rights.
Should Bronstein find acceptance with other courts, it will inevitably
lead to increased police use of marijuana sniffing dogs and other tech-
niques not yet developed. Bronstein represents a substantial departure
from the line of Supreme Court cases from Katz through Terry and its




SCIENTER REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ACTION
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder1
The customers of First Securities Company of Chicago, a small broker-
age firm, invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by Leston
B. Nay, the president and owner of 92% of the firm's stock. Nay induced
the customers to invest their funds in "escrow" accounts that he repre-
sented would yield a high rate of return. In fact, there were no escrow
accounts, nor were any such escrow accounts reflected on the books of First
Securities. 2 Nay had converted the customer's money to his own use im-
mediately upon receipt. Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, had been
retained by First Securities for the purpose of performing periodic audits
of their books and records, and filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the annual reports required of First Securities under section
39. Still troublesome is the fact that the agent had no knowledge of a specific
crime. See note 33 supra.
1. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2. The transactions between Nay and the defrauded customers were not in
the customary form of dealings; checks were made payable to Nay or a designated
bank for his account. The escrow accounts were not shown on First Securities'
periodic accounting to these customers, nor were they included in reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 189.
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17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.3 After the fraud came to
light in 1968, the customers filed suit against Ernst & Ernst 4 for damages,
claiming a violation of Securities and Exchange Commission rule 1Ob-5.5
They charged that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and abetted" Nay in his
violation of rule 1Ob-5 by failing to utilize appropriate auditing procedures
in their audit of First Securities, thereby negligently failing to discover
certain questionable internal practices of the firm.' The customers specifi-
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1934). Section 17(a) "requires that securities brokers or
dealers 'make ... and preserve ... such accounts ... books, and other records,
and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and regulations may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate. . . .' "425 U.S. at 188 n.1. In force at the time
of the alleged violation was Commission Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1975),
requiring that "First Securities file an annual report of its financial condition that
included a certificate stating 'clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to
the financial statement covered by the certificate and the accounting principles and
practices reflected therein.' " 425 U.S. at 188 n.1.
4. The first count of the customer's complaint was actually directed toward
the Midwest Stock Exchange, charging that through its acts and omissions it has also
aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor of the Exchange was
affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974). Two separate but substantially identical
complaints were originally filed by different customers. The district court had
treated the complaints as if consolidated, and they were formally consolidated on
appeal. 425 U.S. at 189 n.2. Nay committed suicide in 1968 leaving a note describ-
ing First Securities as bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Id. at 189.
Although the customers did file suit against First Securities, SEC v. First Securities
Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1973), we are left with
the impression that Nay's estate was insolvent. This explains why the estate was
neither sued separately nor made a party to this action.
5. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule IOb-5 was promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security and
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance of
such rules and regulations as the commission may proscribe. . ..
6. More specifically, the customers claimed that Ernst & Ernst's inadequate
accounting procedures failed to discover Nay's "mail rule," the rule that only Nay
could open mail addressed to him at First Securities, even if it arrived in his
absence. The customers contended that a proper audit of First Securities would
have brought this unusual practice to light, would have been reported by Ernst &
[Vol. 42
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cally disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional misconduct on the
part of Ernst & Ernst.7
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
action, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect
to whether Ernst & Ernst had conducted its audits in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards.8 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that there were
genuine issues of fact to be resolved. 9 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and held that a private cause of action for damages would not lie
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of
"scienter."'10
The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst that a private cause of
action for damages would not lie under rule 10b-5 absent allegations of
"scienter"--an intent to deceive, manipulate, defraudlli-is supported on
three bases: the wording of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, under which rule 10b-5 was promulgated; the legislative
history of section 10(b); and a comparison of section 10(b) with the pro-
cedural requirements and substance of other sections of the 1933 and 1934
Acts.
The Court relied primarily upon the plain meaning rule of statutory
interpretation as applied to section 10(b). It emphasized Congress' use of
the words "manipulative or deceptive" in conjunction with "device or
contrivance" to describe the type of conduct prohibited by section 10(b) . 2
Ernst to the Midwest Stock Exchange as an "irregular procedure" preventing a
truly effective audit, and therefore, would have lead to an investigation of Nay by
the Exchange that would have revealed the fraudulent scheme. 425 U.S. at 190.
7. Id.
8. In doing so, however, the district court rejected the proffered claim of
Ernst & Ernst that a cause of action for aiding and abetting a rule 10b-5 violation
could not be stated merely on allegations of negligence. Id. at 191.
9. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). The court
held that one who breaches a duty of inquiry or disclosure owed to another is liable
in damages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of rule lOb-5 if the
fraud would have been discovered or prevented but for the breach. For support,
the court cited its decision in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974), where it stated on page 374 that in order
to state a claim under rule 10b-5 based on a defendant's aiding and abetting, a
plaintiff must show "that the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge
of or, but for a breach of duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud,
and that possessing such knowledge the party failed to act due to an improper
motive or breach of a duty of disclosure." The court's emphasis on the defendant's
"duty" and the breach of that duty might have signaled the Seventh Circuit's
adoption of the "new" rule lOb-5 standard. See text accompanying notes 30-32
infra.
10. 425 U.S. at 193. The Court defined scienter as an intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 197.
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The majority opinion considered the definitions and connotations of these
words, especially the word "manipulative," which Justice Powell suggested
is almost a term of art in the securities field, connoting "intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors. . .. "13 Respond-
ing to the argument that remedial legislation should be construed "not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses," 14 the Court said that Congress had not adopted a uniform negli-
gence standard for all civil remedies in the securities laws, and therefore,
congressional intent with respect to section 10(b) must be ascertained from
the language of that particular section. 15 The majority found that the
language of section 10(b) clearly connotes intentional misconduct, and that
the clear language of the statute must control.
16
Although the Court said that further inquiry past the wording of the
statute was unnecessary, it turned to the legislative history of section 10(b)
to support its decision. The legislative history of section 10(b) is scant, 17 but
the majority succeeded in finding support for its decision especially from
the Senate and House Reports' 8 on what became section 10(b). They
surmised from the legislative history an overall congressional intent to
prevent manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demon-
strated to fulfill no useful function. 19 The Court emhasized that the Senate
Report indicated that with specified illicit practices, good faith was always a
defense. The majority concluded that section 10(b), a catch-all provision of
the 1934 Act, should be interpreted no more broadly.2
0
Finally, the Court made a comparison of other sections of the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts which imposed liability, noting that everywhere
Congress created an express civil liability, they clearly expressed the stand-
ard (i.e., knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or innocent mistake)
of conduct upon which liability would attach. Congress also included cer-
tain significant procedural restrictions and safeguards within each section
creating an express civil remedy allowing recovery for negligent conduct.
Such safeguards are noticeably absent from section 10(b).21 The Court laid
13. Id. at 199.
14. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). See text
accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
15. 425 U.S. at 200.
16. Id. at 201.
17. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD § 8.4(505) (1975), wherein
Bromberg contends that the legislative history of § 10(b) is simply insufficient to
firmly answer the question of whether Congress intended "scienter" to be an
element of a violation of § 10(b).
18. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
19. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., (1934).
20. 425 U.S. at 206.
21. Id. at 206-11. See also 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, § 8.4(505), where
Professor Bromberg notes that the reason Congress did not specify a standard of
liability, or the elements of such an action is because Congress did not specifically
[Vol. 42
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great emphasis upon this argument, especially in light of the absence of
support from the legislative history for a negligence standard.22
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Brennan. They con-
ceded the technical consistency of the majority opinion, but pointed out
that investors can be "victimized" just as much by negligent conduct as they
can by positive deception.23 Noting that negligence is a violation of lOb-5
when the SEC seeks an injunction,24 the dissent reasoned that the standard
should be the same when a private party sues for damages. 25 Justice
Blackmun concluded that the initial inquiry into whether Ernst & Ernst
had violated rule lOb-5 had been unjustly thwarted, expecially in light of
the auditing accountant's role in insuring a full disclosure of material facts
needed to "safeguard the public interest. '26
After an implied private cause of action under rule 10b-5 was recog-
nized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 27 the question of whether one could
state such a cause of action under rule 1Ob-5 without averring scienter28
provide for private actions under § 10(b). This action was subsequently implied by
the courts. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
22. Id. at 210-11. The Court also dismissed a contention of the SEC that
subsections (2) & (3) of rule lOb-5, if standing alone, could encompass both negli-
gent and intentional behavior, by pointing out that rule lOb-5 was promulgated
pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and that the
administrative agencies were not empowered to make law, but rather to carry into
effect the will of Congress, and therefore could not exceed the scope of the
statutory authority granted to the Commission by Congress. Id. at 212-14. There
were, however, commentators who attempted an analysis of the standard to be
applied in rule 10b-5 by a breakdown of the rule by its sections. See, e.g., Epstein,
The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REV. 482, 491
(1970); and Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the
Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206, 1207 (1970).
23. 425 U.S. at 216.
24. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
25. 425 U.S. at 217-18, where Justice Blackmun said:
I see no real distinction between that situation and this one, for surely
the question whether negligent conduct violates the Rule should not de-
pend upon the plaintiff's identity. If negligence is a violation factor when
the SEC sues, it must be a violation factor when a private party sues.
26. Id. at 218.
27. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
28. One commentator has pointed out the confusion that has existed in the
courts over the exact meaning of "scienter" in rule lob-5 cases. He attributes a large
part of this confusion to a similiar confusion over the definition of scienter as an
element of the common law action of deceit. A partial list of the definitions include:
knowledge, guilty knowledge with intent to deceive, such knowledge as charges a
person with the consequences of his act, a false representation made with knowl-
edge of its falsity, and simply a fraudulent intent. Comment, Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5:
Development of a New Standard, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 493, 495-97 (1974).
Prosser, while listing the elements of the tort action of deceit, defines scienter
as "Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false-or ... that he has not a sufficient basis of information to make it." W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
1977]
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became the topic of an extensive amount of scholarly comment and con-
troversy.2 9 The courts of appeals had taken relatively divergent views on
the subject. Until recently, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have been
characterized as representing the opposite ends of the negligence versus
scienter spectruma 0
The leading case in the Second Circuit standing for the proposition
that some form of scienter is an essential element of a rule 1 Ob-5 violation is
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co. 3 1 The court in Fischman stated that in order
for a plaintiff to state a cause of action under rule 10b-5, proof of an
"ingredient of fraud" would be necessary.3 2 However, the court did not
state explicitly its reasons for requiring proof of this additional element,
nor did it attempt to define "fraud" in this context.33
Professor Bromberg suggests that "probably the most important step toward
clarifying the law of scienter would be to ban the word." 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note
17, at § 8.4 (503) n.14.
29. See generally, 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 8.4; Bucklo, Scienter and
Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Epstein, supra note 22; Jennings, Insider
Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under
Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 809 (1968); Mann, supra note 22; Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 1Ob-5 Purchase and Sale
Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968).
30. Comment, supra note 28, at 499. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
In other circuits besides the Second and Ninth, the courts began introducing and
defining the standard to be applied in rule lob-5 cases. Almost without exception,
the circuits chose to adopt a standard of either negligence or some degree of
scienter, thus following either the Second or Ninth Circuits respectively. See Par-
rent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (seemingly adopting a
negligence standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968) (adopting a negligence standard as sufficient to state a private cause
of action under 10b-5); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.
1971) (following the Second Circuit's standard by requiring "some degree of
scienter").
31. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
32. While distinguishing rule lob-5 and § 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the court stated:
We think that when, to conduct actionable under section 11 of the 1933
Act, there is added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes
actionable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the Rule ....
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951).
33. For cases in the Second Circuit following the "scienter" standard, see
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970);
SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 920 (1969); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). See also what many
consider to be the most important case in the entire lOb-5 area, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Although language in the majority opinion of Texas Gulf has been cited as lending
support to the proposition that the standard to be applied in private actions under
rule lob-5 should be negligence, it is important to note that Judge Waterman later
in the opinion stated that with respect to private actions, "some form of the
traditional scienter requirement. . . is preserved." 401 F.2d at 855. Commentators
[Vol. 42
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In juxtaposition to the Second Circuit's stand is the Ninth Circuit's
leading case, Ellis v. Carter.34 Ellis has been most often cited as standing for
the proposition that in the Ninth Circuit negligent conduct is sufficient to
impose liability for damages in a private action under rule 10b-5.35 It has
also been interpreted as imposing some form of a strict liability standard. 36
Although several courts espoused allowing liability to attach for negli-
gent acts in private actions under 10b-5, such propositions have been
largely dicta.37 One commentator's extensive studies failed to reveal a
single case that actually imposed liability for negligent conduct.38 While the
courts and the commentators were advancing theories that courts were
moving farther and farther away from requiring any type of scienter, these
movements have been recognized as largely superficial.3 9
More recent cases in both the Second and Ninth Circuits had started to
place emphasis on the "duty" of the defendant in a given set of circum-
stances involving alleged rule 10b-5 violations. 40 In doing so, the circuits
began to reject the traditional scienter versus negligence language,41 opting
have suggested that Texas Gulf did little but compound the existing confusion
regarding the scienter requirements of a rule lob-5 violation. Comment, supra note
28, at 503.
34. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). The court's logic for not believing scienter in
any form is required for a violation of rule lob-5 is summed up by the court's
statement at 274:
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative device or
contrivance" in contravention of rules and regulations as might be pre-
scribed by the Commission. It would have been difficult to frame the
authority to prescribe regulations in broader terms. Had Congress in-
tended to limit this authority to regulations proscribing common-law
fraud, it would probably have said so. We see no reason to go beyond the
plain meaning of the word "any," indicating that use of manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivance of whatever kind may be forbidden, to
construe the statute as if it read "any fraudulent" devices.
For a criticism of this logic, and the failure of the court to come "to grips with the
problem," see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 3886 (1969 Supp.).
35. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,855, 868 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also Mann, supra note 22 at 1206.
36. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 8.9 n.102. For cases in the Ninth
Circuit following the lead of Ellis, see Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
37. See Bucklo, supra note 29 at 563; Dykstra, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5,
1967 UTAH L. REV. 207, 219.
38. Bucklo, supra note 29 at 563.
39. Id. at n.5, citing R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION
(1968).
40. This new movement toward a "flexible duty" is represented in the Second
Circuit by three cases: Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir. 1973); and in the Ninth Circuit by White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1974).
41. See generally, as to the development by the circuits of this new standard for
rule lOb-5, Comment, supra note 28 at 514.
1977]
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instead for a "flexible duty" standard. This shift in emphasis might be due
at least in part to the confusion surrounding the use and implementation of
the term "scienter."42 Criticism of inflexible and arbitrary characterizations
of 10b-5 conduct as falling into categories of either negligence or scienter
had also mounted. One commentator concluded that a "continuum of
conduct" approach should be used by the courts as a guide for determining
when liability should attach.43 Whether these recent decisions had in fact
changed the substantive standard for a 1Ob-5 violation as opposed to
simply changing the syntactical formulation of that standard is open to
speculation.
Before Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court had decided relatively few
cases dealing with rule 10b-5 and never had reached the scienter versus
negligence question as a standard for the imposition of liability. In SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.44 the Court discussed the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940.45 It stated that Congress intended this Act, like other
securities legislation enacted to avoid frauds in the securities field, to be
construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes."46 The Court reiterated this language in Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,47 this time with direct reference to
rule lOb-5. 48 The Court's most recent decision in the rule lOb-5 area is
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.49 This case, which was cited extensive-
ly by the Ninth Circuit in its decisions developing the "flexible duty"
standard,50 discussed rule IOb-5 in terms of the duty that the rule imposes,
rather than in terms of common law fraud.5 '
A major criticism of the majority opinion is its failure to deal with the
question of whether a negligence standard as opposed to a scienter stand-
ard for rule 1Ob-5 would best serve the interests of the small investor. If the
purpose of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is to reduce the perils of caveat
emptor in the securities market,5 2 then, in theory, the negligence standard
42. See note 28 supra.
43. Mann, supra note 22 at 1208-09, where the author suggests that such
factors as fiduciary relationships whether defendants are from upper or lower
management, whether one actively participates in the initiation of a securities
transaction, or whether a person receiving information and claiming to be damaged
was himself an insider, are and have been important in deciding whether liability
will attach in certain cases. He concludes that the practice of discussing scienter and
negligence as absolutes capable of objective application should be discontinued.
44. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
45. 54 Stat. 847, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (1970).
46. 375 U.S. at 195.
47. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). See also SEC v. National Securities, Irkc., 393 U.S. 453
(1969).
48. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971),
where Justice Douglas said, "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively."
49. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
50. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
51. See text -accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
52. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
[Vol. 42
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could have best accomplished this goal.5 3 The higher the standard of care,
the higher the probability that buyers and sellers of securities will be more
willing to release material facts concerning securities involved, rather than
risk imposition of liability for a negligent oversight or omission. 4 By opting
for a scienter standard, the Court decided instead to protect the interests of
accountants55 and corporate insiders by supplying them with the ready
defense of "good faith."
The discussion in Ernst & Ernst as to whether Congress intended rule
lOb-5 to be enforced with a negligence standard or a scienter standard is of
itself somewhat of an anomaly. The majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst
discusses at length congressional intent in determining what standard is to
be applied in private causes of action under rule lOb-5. In truth and fact,
the courts, not Congress, "legislated" this private cause of action into being
by inferring a private right of action for damages in Kardon v. National
Gyspumr. 5 6 If the Court had indeed been interested in serving the wishes of
Congress with respect to rule 1Ob-5, that intent probably would have been
better surmised by looking to the overall purpose of securities fraud legisla-
tion. The Court chose instead to look for some congressional legislative
intent for a private action created solely by the judiciary.
Whether the "flexible duty" standard that had recently been de-
veloped by the Second and Ninth Circuits is still applicable to rule 1Ob-5
violations is open to question. The Court failed to discuss the exact degree
of scienter that will be required for a rule 1Ob-5 violation. The Second
53. For a discussion of how the decision in this case may prompt congressional
reaction to amend rule lOb-5 to allow recovery in private suits for non-intentional
misconduct, see Note, Securities Law--Private Cause ofActionfor Damages Under Rule
10b-5 Requires Scienter, 25 EMORY L. REV. 465 (1976).
54. Some commentators have suggested, however, that a negligence standard
would have the opposite effect-i.e., the higher standard of care would cause
buyers and sellers to become more apprehensive about negligently releasing mis-
leading information, and thus actually reduce the free flow of information. Epstein,
supra note 22 at 504.
55. For a discussion praising the Supreme Court's decision in this case ex-
pressing the view that a negligence standard would have "demanded a degree of
perfection which is very difficult to achieve" in the complex field of accounting, see
Note, Securities-Accountant's Liability---United States Supreme Court Holds Accountant
Not Liable Under Rule 10b-5 Unless Defendant Intended to Deceive, Manipulate or
Defraud Investor, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 775 (1976). For a discussion of this case at
the court of appeals level discussing accountants' liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of rule lOb-5, see Note, Securities Lau-Accountants' Liability, 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 158 (1975). One case subsequent to the decision in Ernst & Ernst
holding accountants liable for a violation of rule 10b-5 is Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
It is interesting to note that the question of whether civil liability for aiding and
abetting is actually appropriate under rule lOb-5 was not reached in this decision.
However, the Court arguably sanctioned such aiding and abetting, at least in the
case of accountants, by reaching the scienter question instead of dismissing the
action as inappropriate under rule lob-5.
56. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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Circuit, which had imposed a scienter standard, stated that the degree of
scienter required under rule IOb-5 was not as great as that for common law
fraud.5 7 Whether the Court in Ernst & Ernst redefined scienter to the
extent that this decision has been overruled is a critical question. If over-
ruled, it is possible to read Ernst & Ernst as reducing rule 1Ob-5 to little
more than a method of evoking federal jurisdiction for a common law tort
action of fraud.58 In addition, state courts may now prove to be a more
advantageous forum for securities litigation if the common law action for
negligent misrepresentation is still recognized. 59
Ernst & Ernst represents another step in the Supreme Court's narrow-
ing of the scope of rule IOb-5-a continuation of the process begun by Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores6" to define and delimit the ever-increasing
scope of rule 1Ob-5. In Blue Chip the Court retreated to the Birnbaum Rule,
limiting the class of possible plaintiffs in 1 Ob-5 actions to buyers and sellers
of securities. Now, in Ernst & Ernst, the Court has chosen to limit the class
of possible defendants by requiring allegations of scienter in private actions
under rule lOb-5.
The total effect of Ernst & Ernst, especially when considered in connec-
tion with Blue Chip, will no doubt be to reduce the number of cases litigated
in the securities fraud area. With only dicta to support a negligence stand-
ard in the thirty year history of private actions under rule 1Ob-5,6 1 the only
practical effect of the decision in Ernst v. Ernst, standing alone, may be to
shift the controversy in the 1Ob-5 area from scienter versus negligence to
the degree of scienter required for a rule 1Ob-5 violation.
TIMOTHY W. TRIPLETT
57. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
58. Arguably, the need to formally prove reasonable reliance is not necessary
for a prima facie case under rule lob-5 but is necessary under common law fraud.
However, because one must now be a buyer or seller under the Birnbaum Rule and
because of the necessity of proving materiality under rule 1Ob-5, proof of reliance
will probably always be present to some degree.
59. Such a cause of action is recognized in Missouri. For a Missouri case
holding accountants liable for negligent misrepresentations to plaintiffs who were
"forseeable" users of the auditor's report, see Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox &
Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
60. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975). See also, Evans, Securities Regulations-Standing To
Sue Under Rule lOb-5-Supreme Court Adopts Birnbaum Doctrine, 41 Mo. L. REv. 296
(1976).
61. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
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